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Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, 
Incrementalism, and the Marriage/Civil Union 
Distinction  
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG 
History and tradition have taken a prominent place as favored 
rationales for the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  
Incrementalism likewise has been invoked to suggest that states can 
permissibly move “one step at a time” to redress the unequal status of 
same-sex couples, including by creating a civil union/marriage regime 
instead of providing marriage for all. Yet constitutional jurisprudence is 
clear that neither longevity nor tradition alone can justify the continuation 
of a discriminatory rule.  This Article asks, then, what work these 
rationales perform in the marriage/civil union jurisprudence and debate, 
given their inadequacy from a doctrinal standpoint.   
The central claim here is that governments invoke history and tradition 
to suggest that private actors, rather than the state, are responsible for 
marriage having a higher social status than civil unions.  Yet this premise 
ignores the state’s monopoly over marriage and, therefore, over 
marriage’s socially valuable connotations.  Consequently, even if private 
actors contribute to marriage’s special social value, state control over 
access to that value falls well within standard understandings of state 
action.  Context-sensitive skepticism is similarly necessary toward state 
claims that unequal treatment should be sustained so long as the inequality 
is characterized as an incremental step in the direction of full equality.  
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Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, 
Incrementalism, and the Marriage/Civil Union 
Distinction  
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rationales for maintaining civil unions for same-sex couples1 and 
marriage for different-sex couples come in two basic forms.2  One rests on 
an express preference for heterosexual coupling;3 the other invokes history 
and tradition to justify the different relationship-recognition regimes.4  This 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Thanks to Henry Monaghan, Gillian Metzger, Philip Hamburger, Ariela Dubler, and Nate 
Persily for their insights and to David Pennington and Amy McCamphill for helpful research 
assistance.  In the interest of full disclosure, I filed amicus briefs in support of couples seeking marriage 
in the California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, and New York cases discussed below. 
1 Two main statuses have evolved as “marriage equivalents” in the United States, although it is 
important to note that neither of these provides rights, obligations, or benefits that are fully identical to 
marriage.  Civil unions were first, having been created by the Vermont legislature in 2000 following 
the Vermont Supreme Court’s determination that the state could not deprive same-sex couples of the 
same “benefits and protections” accorded to different-sex couples through marriage.  Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002).  After that, legislatures in 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Jersey enacted civil union laws.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
46b-38nn (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 
2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2007).  The states of California, Maine, Oregon, and 
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia, enacted similar measures but labeled them “domestic 
partnerships.”  CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–98 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (LexisNexis 2001 
& Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (1964 & Supp. 2008); H.B. 2007(9)(3), 74th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.010 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).  In addition, 
Hawaii created a “reciprocal beneficiary” status in 1997 that provides certain rights and benefits to 
intimate partners and others who are precluded by law from marrying.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 
(2006).   
In 2009, the states of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont all changed their 
relationship recognition regimes so that same-sex couples are now included within marriage.  See 2009 
Conn. Adv. Legis. Serv. 13; 2009 Me. Adv. Legis. Serv. 82; 2009 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 59; 2009 Vt. 
Adv. Legis. Serv. 3.  
2 Under both federal and state constitutions, equality guarantees require that governments have at 
least a rational explanation for the classifications they draw.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996) (observing that classifications must “bear a rational relationship to an independent and 
legitimate legislative end”). 
3 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008) (describing “the belief 
that the preservation of marriage as a heterosexual institution is in the best interests of children, or that 
prohibiting same sex couples from marrying promotes responsible heterosexual procreation” as “two 
reasons often relied on by states in defending statutory provisions barring same sex marriage against 
claims that those provisions do not pass even rational basis review”) (citation omitted). 
4 See infra notes 8–30 and accompanying text.  A variation in this argument maintains that the 
state should be free to exclude same-sex couples from marriage to conform with the law in other states.  
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (“In arguing to uphold the system of disparate 
treatment that disfavors same-sex couples, the State offers as a justification the interest in uniformity 
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latter argument typically twins history and tradition5 to suggest that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is justified because “‘that is 
the definition of marriage that has always existed.’”6  
With the “heterosexual-preference” argument having been engaged 
thoroughly by numerous courts and scholars,7 I turn in this Article to the 
                                                                                                                          
with other states’ laws.”).  This conformity argument could be characterized as suffering from the same 
flaw discussed later in the Article regarding the history and tradition rationales, in that the state 
invoking it seeks to locate responsibility for the discriminatory treatment not in relation to the same-sex 
couples being burdened but rather in a source outside the state’s control.  In response, in New Jersey, 
the state’s highest court observed that “[i]n protecting the rights of citizens of this State, we have never 
slavishly followed the popular trends in other jurisdictions, particularly when the majority approach is 
incompatible with the unique interests, values, customs, and concerns of our people.”  Id. at 220. 
5 Although history and tradition are conceptually separable, they tend to be used interchangeably 
in discussions about marriage.  One could profitably separate the work of the two; however, because 
the focus of this Article is on the ways that history and tradition, together, stand in for other arguments, 
distilling the distinct effects of the history and tradition frames is beyond the scope here.   
6 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478 (quoting the defendants); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (describing the state’s asserted “interest in retaining the traditional and well-
established definition of marriage”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 432 (“The State rests its case on age-old 
traditions, beliefs, and laws, which have defined the essential nature of marriage to be the union of a 
man and a woman.  The long-held historical view of marriage, according to the State, provides a 
sufficient basis to uphold the constitutionality of the marriage statutes.”). 
7 See, e.g., Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 430–33 (rejecting the argument that “because only a man 
and a woman can produce children biologically with one another, the constitutional right to marry 
necessarily is limited to opposite-sex couples”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.26 (Iowa 
2009) (“The research appears to strongly support the conclusion that same-sex couples foster the same 
wholesome environment as opposite-sex couples and suggests that the traditional notion that children 
need a mother and a father to be raised into healthy, well-adjusted adults is based more on stereotype 
than anything else.”);  id. at  901 (finding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage does 
not benefit children of heterosexual or gay and lesbian parents); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 999–1000 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state legislature 
rationally could have concluded that “married opposite-sex parents” are “the optimal social structure in 
which to bear children” and that same-sex couples “present[] an alternative structure for child rearing 
that has not yet proved itself”); id. at 963, 965 n.28 (majority opinion) (observing that “the ‘best 
interests of the child’ standard does not turn on a parent’s sexual orientation or marital status” and 
criticizing the argument that  “marriage is intimately tied to the reproductive systems of the marriage 
partners and to the ‘optimal’ mother and father setting for child rearing” as “hew[ing] perilously close 
to the argument, long repudiated by the Legislature and the courts, that men and women are so innately 
and fundamentally different that their respective ‘proper spheres’ can be rigidly and universally 
delineated”); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that “the Legislature could 
rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will do best with a mother and father in 
the home”); id. at 32 (Kaye, C.J, dissenting) (citing amicus brief of American Psychological 
Association et al. containing “results of social scientific research studies which conclude that children 
raised by same-sex parents fare no differently from, and do as well as, those raised by opposite-sex 
parents in terms of the quality of the parent-child relationship and the mental health, development and 
social adjustment of the child” and concluding that no rational basis could justify the state excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage). 
For literature focused specifically on procreation-related arguments, see, for example, Courtney 
Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist 
Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393 (2007), and Edward Stein, The “Accidental 
Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  For discussions of the defects of heterosexual preference arguments more 
generally, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intuition, Morals, and the Legal Conversation About Gay Rights, 
32 NOVA L. REV. 523 (2008); Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the 
United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607 (2006); and Lawrence A. 
Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different from Heterosexual Married 
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work of history and tradition.8  I turn, as well, to the closely related 
reliance on incrementalism as a reason why legislatures need not rectify 
the different treatment of same- and different-sex couples by offering the 
same status to both.    
My claim, in a nutshell, is that the history, tradition, and 
incrementalism rationales, as used in this context, contain an implicit and 
erroneous premise:  that the state did not cause and is therefore not 
responsible to address the lesser social value of civil unions vis-a-vis 
marriage.9  In this guise, history and tradition are used to signal that forces 
outside of the state’s control have given marriage whatever special status it 
has.10  With this foundation, the argument follows that equality 
                                                                                                                          
Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE  & FAM. 880 (2004). 
8 I focus particularly on the work these rationales do to respond to arguments that the marriage 
classification violates the equal protection rights of same-sex couples.  History and tradition are also 
frequently advanced to support arguments that marriage is not a fundamental right for same-sex 
couples and therefore subject only to relatively weak protection under due process guarantees.  The 
state of Connecticut, for example, argued that “since ancient times, marriage has been understood to be 
the union of a man and a woman, and only such rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this [n]ation’s history 
and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are deemed to be fundamental.”  
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 414 (Conn. 2008) (citation omitted).  The state 
added that “in light of the universally understood definition of marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman, the right that the plaintiffs were asserting, namely, the right to marry ‘any person of one’s 
choosing,’ is not a fundamental right.”  Id.  Although the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to 
address the fundamental rights argument, id. at 412, other state courts responded to similar arguments.  
See, e.g., Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 420–21 (rejecting the argument that the marriage right claimed 
in the case could not be deemed fundamental without historical and precedential support for a “right to 
same sex marriage,” and proceeding instead to focus on the “meaning and substance of the 
constitutional right to marry”); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 (observing that “long history availed 
not” in attempts to overcome due process arguments challenging prohibitions against interracial 
marriage).  
While the use of history and tradition to set the definition of the right in question suffers some of 
the same flaws I identify here in connection with the rationales’ use in the equal protection context, the 
fundamental rights analysis also raises a different, though related, set of issues regarding the nature of 
the right and the level of generality at which the right is defined.  See generally Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (“[W]e have a tradition of carefully formulating the interest at 
stake in substantive-due-process cases.”); Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality 
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).  To keep the discussion here centered on 
the way in which these rationales are used to distinguish between state and societal responsibility, this 
Article focuses on their use in the equal protection context. 
9 There is a separate argument to be made (not here) about the factual inaccuracy of the claim that 
the tradition and history of marriage is as static as those rationales suggest.  For further discussion on 
that point, see, for example, Suzanne B. Goldberg, A Historical Guide To The Future Of Marriage For 
Same-Sex Couples, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg, Historical Guide].  
10 There is disagreement over whether marriage, regardless of its social value, should be treated 
by government as a uniquely privileged familial status.  See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); 
NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE 
LAW 46–62 (2008) (advocating recognition of family forms that turn on function and need rather than 
marital status).  Because this Article takes the history and tradition rationales and the related unique 
social status of marriage as its point of departure, the focus here is not on the serious concerns raised by 
Professors Fineman, Polikoff and others regarding the unique treatment of marriage by the state. 
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guarantees11 can tolerate the status difference in the relationship-
recognition rules so long as the state equalizes the benefits and obligations 
within its control.12  And, from there, the state’s creation of civil unions 
can be framed as a permissible and reasonable incrementalist move toward 
equal relationship rights; further steps may be taken but none is required.   
Yet, I argue below, the foundational premise—that the state is not 
responsible for the social value of marriage if it did not create the value 
itself—elides and obscures the deficiencies of history and tradition as 
constitutional rationales here 13  The “not our fault” premise obscures, as 
well, the serious flaw in the recasting of these rationales as the permissible 
incrementalist work of the legislature. 
The history and tradition rationales may have received less scholarly 
attention to date in part because they conflict so patently with 
constitutional doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly made 
clear that while past practices are a useful starting point for analysis, 
history and tradition cannot alone justify retention of a discriminatory or 
exclusionary rule.  “Neither the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of 
steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries 
insulates it from constitutional attack,”14 the Court has said.  It has 
observed, as well, that “[i]t is obviously correct that no one acquires a 
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even 
when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed 
predates it.”15  
                                                                                                                          
11 Litigants typically advance due process as well as equal protection challenges to states’ 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, And Justice for All?  
Litigation, Politics, and the State of Marriage Equality Today, ADVANCE, Spring 2007, at 33, 42, 
available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/3779 [hereinafter Goldberg, Justice for All?] (follow 
“attachment” pdf hyperlink). 
12 States make history and tradition arguments in contexts where there is no equalization of 
benefits as well.  In those cases, the premise is the same—that the harms to individuals are not the 
state’s fault—but the argument is asked to do more work, in that the state seeks to justify not only 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage but also excluding them from equal treatment.  See, e.g., 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“The critical question is whether a rational legislature could decide that . . 
. benefits should be given to members of opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex couples.”).  Because 
marriage/civil union cases, like Kerrigan, present the premise in its most limited form, this Article 
concentrates on them here, on the theory that arguments related to the narrower use of the “not our 
fault” rationale extend as well to the rationale’s broader use. 
13 The premise also obscures the state’s role in contributing to and sustaining that value by 
privileging marriage over all other forms of adult intimate relationships, which receive fewer rights and 
benefits, as well as less state-sponsored social recognition.  For purposes here, however, the argument 
does not turn on whether or how much value the state has contributed to marriage’s social status.   
14 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 
235, 239 (1970)).  Not all members of the Court share this view.  In opposing the majority’s 
determination that the Virginia Military Institute could not constitutionally exclude women from 
admission, Justice Scalia stated his “view that ‘when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of 
the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use 
that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down.’”  United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).   
15 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
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Indeed, if history and tradition were all that was necessary to justify 
governmental line-drawing, there would be few long-sanctioned 
distinctions susceptible to contemporary invalidation.  States could insulate 
discriminatory practices simply by showing that they had engaged in those 
practices for years, if not decades.16 
To be sure, due process doctrine “has often been interpreted so as to 
protect traditionally recognized rights from state and federal power,”17 and, 
consequently, to give greater valence to arguments rooted in history and 
tradition.  As Justice Scalia observed for a majority of the Court in 
sustaining a jurisdictional rule against a due process challenge, a 
longstanding rule’s “validation is in its pedigree.”18   
Yet, longevity alone is insufficient as a response to the equal 
protection inquiry.19  Standard equal protection doctrine makes clear that a 
classification cannot be justified by reference to itself; instead, the doctrine 
                                                                                                                          
16 Even if history were considered an inadequate justification under heightened forms of scrutiny, 
most classifications are subject to rational basis review.  Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without 
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485 & nn.14, 17 (2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers] 
(noting that “set” of classifications subject to heightened federal equal protection review, which 
currently includes “race, alienage, national origin, sex, and nonmarital parentage,” closed formally in 
1976 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that sex-based classifications warranted heightened scrutiny).  
While some states have expanded their own constitutional jurisprudence to include categories that 
federal heightened scrutiny has not yet reached, including heightened scrutiny of sexual orientation-
based classifications, the set still remains small.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 
(Cal. 2008) (concluding “that statutes imposing differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation 
should be viewed as constitutionally suspect under the California Constitution’s equal protection 
clause”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (finding “statutes 
discriminating against gay persons are subject to heightened or intermediate judicial scrutiny”); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895–96 (Iowa 2009) (same). 
A small minority of states do not follow the federal-style tiered framework, but they likewise 
demand weaker justifications for classifications depending on such factors as “the nature of the affected 
right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the 
restriction.”  McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 771 A.2d 1123, 1131 (N.J. 2001) (quoting Greenberg v. 
Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985)); see also State Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 
629 (Alaska 1993) (applying “a sliding scale under which [t]he applicable standard of review for a 
given case is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of 
suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1988).  But see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 
(2000) (maintaining that the Court’s precedents do not strongly support the characterization of due 
process as tradition-preserving relative to equal protection). 
18 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).  The specific issue in Burnham 
concerned whether a state’s exercise of transitory jurisdiction offended the Due Process Clause, a 
context with implications that are arguably distinct in kind from the long-term recognition and life-
planning issues raised by denial of marriage to same-sex couples. 
19 Although this position dominates equal protection jurisprudence for the reasons set out in the 
discussion below, Justice Scalia has taken exception, suggesting that the deference to historical 
practices that he characterizes as fundamental to due process extends to equal protection analysis as 
well.  See, e.g., Virginia v. United States, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing 
the “function of this Court [as] to preserve our society’s values regarding . . . equal protection, not to 
revise them” ); see also supra note 14.    
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requires an independent justification for state-sponsored distinctions.20  As 
the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in reviewing the state’s marriage 
law in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, “[t]o say that the 
discrimination is ‘traditional’ is to say only that the discrimination has 
existed for a long time.”21  Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s invalidation 
of Colorado’s ban on anti-discrimination protections for gay people, the 
court added that “a classification . . . cannot be maintained merely ‘for its 
own sake.’”22  American constitutional history reinforces the point.  The 
legacy of discriminatory rules based on race, sex, and other characteristics 
would have made invalidation of those distinctions more difficult, if not 
impossible, were history and tradition sufficient responses to equal 
protection challenges.23 
Still, states defending themselves in marriage litigation continue to 
advance past practices to justify ongoing discrimination.  As Connecticut 
argued in defending its limitation of marriage to different-sex couples,  
[i]t is entirely rational for the legislature to retain the term 
‘marriage’ to describe the union of one man and one woman 
because that is the definition of marriage that has always 
existed in Connecticut throughout its history and continues to 
represent the common understanding of marriage in almost 
all states in the country.24   
New Jersey defended its marriage law in a similar way, “rest[ing] its case 
on age-old traditions, beliefs, and laws, which have defined the essential 
                                                                                                                          
20 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“By requiring that the classification bear a 
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are 
not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”) (emphasis added). 
21 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008). 
22 Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).  Chief Judge Kaye, dissenting from the New York state 
high court’s validation of that state’s marriage law, similarly observed that “[b]ecause the ‘tradition’ of 
excluding gay [persons] from civil marriage is no different from the classification itself, the exclusion 
cannot be justified on the basis of ‘history.’  Indeed, the justification of ‘tradition’ does not explain the 
classification; it merely repeats it.”  Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 33 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 898 (Iowa 2009) (“A specific tradition sought 
to be maintained cannot be an important government objective . . . when the tradition is nothing more 
than the historical classification currently expressed in the statute being challenged.”); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972–73 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring) (“To define the 
institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to 
justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core 
question [at issue in the equal protection inquiry].”). 
23 See generally Goldberg, Equality, supra note 16, at 497–515 (reviewing numerous 
classifications invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
24 Brief of Defendant-Appellees with Appendix at 54, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. 17716); see 
also id. at 56 (“Given Connecticut’s long-held understanding of marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman, which is consistent with the definition of marriage in every other state in the nation except 
Massachusetts, it simply cannot be deemed ‘irrational’ for the legislature, while electing to extend new 
rights to same-sex relationships, to have chosen to describe such relationships using a term other than 
‘marriage.’”). 
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nature of marriage to be the union of a man and a woman.”25  According to 
that state, this “long-held historical view of marriage . . . provides a 
sufficient basis to uphold the constitutionality of the marriage statutes.”26  
California likewise advanced the argument that the marriage restriction 
could not be invalidated by the state’s courts “because the institution of 
marriage traditionally (both in California and throughout most of the 
world) has been limited to a union between a man and a woman.”27 
Judges have also, at times, accepted history and tradition as rationales 
for states’ exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, notwithstanding 
doctrinal admonitions to the contrary.28  For example, although a majority 
of the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to accept the state’s history and 
tradition justifications, the lead dissenting opinion invoked marriage’s 
ancient history as a reason to castigate the court’s marriage equality ruling.  
Declaring marriage “the product of a state’s history, tradition, custom, 
widely shared expectations and law,” the dissent characterized the 
majority’s decision as “an extreme” and improper determination.29 
The New Jersey Supreme Court likewise latched on to history and 
tradition as the reason the state could not be barred from reserving 
marriage to different-sex couples.  The court criticized the dissenters in 
that case, who would have ordered full marriage equality, for 
“substitut[ing] their judicial definition of marriage for the statutory 
definition, for the definition that has reigned for centuries, for the 
definition that is accepted in forty-nine states and in the vast majority of 
countries in the world.”30 
                                                                                                                          
25 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 206 (N.J. 2006). 
26 Id. 
27 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 447–48 (Cal. 2008).   
28 In California, for example, the majority observed the well-settled state constitutional doctrine 
holding that “[t]radition alone, however, generally has not been viewed as a sufficient justification for 
perpetuating, without examination, the restriction or denial of a fundamental constitutional right.”  Id. 
at 427.  The dissenters, by contrast, embraced the position that “the state has a legitimate interest in 
enforcing the express legislative and popular will that the traditional definition of marriage be 
preserved.”  Id. at 464 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 469 (Corrigan, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“The people are entitled to preserve this traditional understanding in the 
terminology of the law, recognizing that same-sex and opposite-sex unions are different.”) (emphasis 
added).  
29 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 505 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting); 
see also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (supporting its decision to sustain the 
different-sex marriage law by emphasizing that, until relatively recently, “it was an accepted truth for 
almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there could be marriages 
only between participants of different sex”).  
30 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 222.  The court added: 
We cannot escape the reality that the shared societal meaning of marriage—
passed down through the common law into our statutory law—has always been the 
union of a man and a woman.  To alter that meaning would render a profound 
change in the public consciousness of a social institution of ancient origin. 
Id.  The California appellate court which sustained the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
likewise concluded that it was “rational for the Legislature to preserve the opposite-sex definition of 
marriage, which has existed throughout history and which continues to represent the common 
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Further, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas, 
cited tradition as a permissible rationale for reserving marriage only to 
different-sex couples.  Contrasting the rejection of tradition as a 
justification for the Texas sodomy statute invalidated in Lawrence, 
O’Connor wrote that “preserving the traditional institution” would be a 
legitimate basis for sustaining the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage.31 
Given their weak doctrinal footing,32 history and tradition rationales 
must be doing some other work in the contemporary marriage cases33 to be 
taken as seriously as they have been.  My interest here is in illuminating 
this work.  My aim, as well, is to call the rationales more deeply into 
question and to suggest several broader concerns about the use of history 
and tradition, and the related use of incrementalism, as independent 
justifications for government action even outside the marriage context. 
I proceed by identifying in Part II the set of reasons why states might 
advance history and tradition as rationales and why judges might accept 
them despite their inadequacy as legal arguments.  The third Part exposes 
how the “not our fault” premise operates within the invocations of history 
and tradition in the marriage/civil union context.  In Part IV, I develop the 
constitutional implications of the state’s monopolistic control over access 
to marriage even given the role of private sentiment in creating and 
preserving marriage’s unique social value.  The fifth Part examines the 
flaws of the related incrementalism rationale, and a brief conclusion 
follows. 
II.  ON THE APPEAL OF HISTORY AND TRADITION AS RATIONALES 
One might plausibly argue that the reason governments invoke history 
and tradition in the context of marriage litigation has less to do with 
constitutional doctrine than just suggested.  Instead, it is quite possible, 
indeed likely in some instances, that the rationale’s use is the product of a 
political calculation by state officials who want to avoid expressing dislike 
or disapproval of gay and lesbian couples but need, by virtue of their 
                                                                                                                          
understanding of marriage in most other countries and states of our union.”  In re Marriage Cases, 49 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  She did not explain 
why the marriage rule escaped the Court’s admonitions about the limitations of history in other 
contexts. 
32 See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. 
33 An earlier set of cases brought during the 1970s and 1980s, in which litigants universally lost 
their challenges to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, are likely best explained by socio-
cultural factors and the political and legal opportunity structures that more generally shaped the 
treatment of gay rights claims at that time.  See Goldberg, Justice for All?, supra note 11, at 34–35 
(reviewing early marriage litigation in the U.S.); see also ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE 
CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 
(2006) (tracing gay rights litigation pursued by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund). 
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institutional role, to defend the state law.34  By avoiding the “heterosexual 
preference” argument, which is the other leading explanation for the 
distinction between same- and different-sex couples,35 officials can 
arguably elide accusations of bias and minimize the offense taken by their 
lesbian, gay and allied constituents.  Connecticut’s express disavowal of 
the position that “the preservation of marriage as a heterosexual institution 
is in the best interests of children, or that prohibiting same sex couples 
from marrying promotes responsible heterosexual procreation,”36 might be 
explained in this way.37  
Alternately, the proffer of history and tradition might flow from 
concerns that a state’s credibility will be diminished if it takes a 
“heterosexual-preference” position in marriage when it rejects that position 
elsewhere in its law and policy.  In particular, if the state’s courts do not 
treat sexual orientation as a relevant factor in custody determinations, and 
if the state permits lesbians and gay men to foster and adopt children on 
equal footing with non-gay adults, there is no plausible ground for 
asserting a preference for heterosexual parents as a matter of state policy.38   
                                                                                                                          
34 Although a state could conceivably agree with the litigants’ challenges and leave other 
interested parties to defend the distinction, this has not occurred in any marriage litigation (or in any 
gay rights litigation that I have found in which the state has been named a defendant) and is not likely 
to occur given the political risks state officials would almost surely face for a refusal to defend a state 
law.  This would be particularly true, it seems, where the state is charged with defending a measure 
passed by voter initiative, which was the case in California.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402–
03 (Cal. 2008).  Still, states can limit, and some have limited, the arguments they are willing to make to 
defend their marriage laws, and, in a number of cases, amici have advanced the child protection 
argument where the state has specifically disclaimed a preference for heterosexual parents.  Compare, 
e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 477–78 (Conn. 2008) (noting that the state had 
disavowed any claim that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was “motivated by” an 
interest in children having heterosexual parents or in promoting procreation by heterosexuals), with 
Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae at 11, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. 17716) 
(“[T]he promotion of responsible procreation . . . is an important and central interest served by 
marriage laws to encourage the optimal environment for rearing the resulting children.”), and Brief 
Amicus Curiae of United Families Conn. in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 7–8, Kerrigan, 957 
A.2d 407 (No. 17716) (arguing that the institution of marriage is fundamentally focused on child-
rearing and that heterseoxuals are better suited than gay and lesbian adults for that responsibility). 
35 See supra notes 3, 7, and accompanying text. 
36 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 477–78. 
37 See also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 428 (Cal. 2008) (“This state’s current policies and 
conduct regarding homosexuality recognize that . . . gay individuals are fully capable of entering into 
the kind of loving and enduring committed relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family 
and of responsibly caring for and raising children.”); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 205–06 (N.J. 
2006) (“The State concedes that state law and policy do not support the argument that limiting marriage 
to heterosexual couples is necessary for either procreative purposes or providing the optimal 
environment for raising children.”). 
38 Yet this point did not stop New York’s highest court from embracing the child-welfare 
rationale to justify the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  The majority explained that “[a] 
person’s preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to 
the [s]tate’s interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best.”  Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006); see also id. at 7 (“The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, 
other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father.  Intuition and 
experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of 
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Yet another possibility is that states invoke history and tradition not 
out of solicitude for their gay and lesbian constituents or out of an interest 
in political consistency but instead out of a strategic decision to mask their 
disapproval of or hostility toward homosexuality or same-sex couples.  As 
Justice Scalia asserted, in response to Justice O’Connor’s embrace of the 
tradition rationale in Lawrence, “‘preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval 
of same-sex couples.”39 
Still another explanation for the history and tradition proffer might be 
an underlying commitment to a Burkean-style incrementalism, with the 
view that the risks associated with sharply altering tradition may outweigh 
the benefits of change.40  One version of this argument would cite the 
dangers associated with casting off the wisdom of the ages in favor of the 
unknown, and take the position that change ought to occur slowly and 
incrementally to minimize the risk of error and unnecessary loss of past 
value.41  A second version would acknowledge the different-sex marriage 
rule as arbitrary but seek to preserve it nonetheless because it had become, 
over time, organic to and constitutive of the political community.  On this 
view, the current rule’s undoing, even in the name of equality, could 
endanger the polity because of our long-term collective reliance on the rule 
as an important, if not foundational, socio-political organizing premise.42  
Although courts grapple with a set of institutional legitimacy concerns 
different from that of legislators, the history and tradition rationale might 
also be accepted in the adjudication context for reasons similar to those just 
discussed.  Judges are less likely to be accused of acting on personal biases 
if they embrace a neutral-sounding rationale like history and tradition than 
if they declare the legitimacy of the legislature’s belief that heterosexuals 
are better at parenting than gay people.  And judges in jurisdictions that 
have disavowed distinctions based on sexual orientation in other contexts 
                                                                                                                          
what both a man and a woman are like.”).  But see id. at 32 (stating that “such a preference would be 
contrary to the stated public policy of New York, and therefore irrational”) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).  
39 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
40 See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 259 (J.C.D. Clark 
ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (“By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as 
much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of 
the commonwealth would be broken.  No one generation could link with the other.”); see also Cass 
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) (explaining that “Burkeans insist 
on incrementalism; but they also emphasize the need for judges to pay careful heed to established 
traditions”).  Even here, however, there is a strong argument that permitting same-sex couples to marry 
is the next reasonable incremental step in the evolution of marriage over time.  See Goldberg, 
Historical Guide, supra note 9. 
41 This approach could also be aimed strategically to pick up some of the presumptive valuing of 
tradition expressed within due process doctrine.  See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.  
42 Of course, if Burkean incrementalism and these related arguments were to become an accepted 
constitutional justification in response to equal protection challenges, they would have the same 
potential as the history and tradition rationales to justify virtually all governmental classifications, but 
more on that below. 
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may find it difficult to embrace an explicit preference for heterosexual 
parents where no such preference exists elsewhere in state law.43 
III.  THE “NOT OUR FAULT” ARGUMENT AT WORK 
Although all of these factors likely contribute to the sustained attention 
the history and tradition rationales have received in the marriage/civil 
union setting, my claim here is that their traction derives not only from 
their political or adjudicative expedience but also from their implicit 
distinction between social value (i.e. the value that arises from historical 
pedigree and traditional status) and state responsibility.  This Part will 
illuminate that distinction; in the next Part, I will show the distinction’s 
flaws. 
The history and tradition rationales start from the premise that 
marriage has special value relative to civil unions.  They recognize, too, 
that different-sex couples are the exclusive beneficiaries of that value 
under current marriage rules.  After all, absent any difference in value 
between civil unions and marriage, no explanation for the different 
treatment would be needed because, arguably, the government would have 
not drawn a classification warranting scrutiny.  Along these lines, the 
Kerrigan majority specifically rejected the state trial court’s determination 
that no cognizable harm arose from the difference between the two statuses 
and that, therefore, the state did not need to justify the distinction.44   
Instead, the court described marriage as holding an “exalted status” and 
civil unions as “new and unfamiliar.”45  The Kerrigan dissenters also 
recognized that the two statuses were different “‘in the public 
consciousness,’”46 even while arguing that the difference should be 
sustained as a constitutional matter.  The lead dissent, for example, 
explicitly characterized civil unions as “an important step in th[e] process” 
toward marriage, thereby acknowledging the lack of equivalence between 
the two statuses.47 
                                                                                                                          
43 Some judges have not found this to be an insurmountable hurdle, as noted earlier.  See supra 
note 38; see also Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8 (accepting  the “commonsense premise that children will 
do best with a mother and father in the home,” even though state statutory and case law specifically 
forbade treating sexual orientation as a negative factor in parenting determinations).   
44 See Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (finding that “the plaintiffs have 
failed to prove that they have suffered any legal harm that rises to constitutional magnitude”).   
45 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416–18 (Conn. 2008). 
46 Id. at 505 (Borden, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006)). 
47 Id. at 514.  Interestingly, at one point the same dissenter questioned whether civil unions were 
actually less socially valuable than marriage.  See id. at 486 (“In short, the state of social flux in this 
entire realm is simply too new and too untested for four members of this court to declare as an 
established social fact that civil unions are of lesser status than marriage in our state.”).  But see id. at 
419 n.16 (majority opinion) (responding to this argument by observing that “[w]e do not see how the 
recently created legal entity of civil union possibly can embody the same status as an institution of such 
long-standing and overriding societal importance as marriage”); see also id. at 417 n.14 (“‘Any married 
couple [reasonably] would feel that they had lost something precious and irreplaceable if the 
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In the usual constitutional analysis, the next step would be to identify a 
difference between same-sex and different-sex couples that could justify 
this uneven distribution of a valued status.  Instead of following this 
course, however, the history and tradition rationales reframe the equal 
protection inquiry.  They concede the distinction but maintain that society, 
rather than the state, is responsible for the special value of marriage 
relative to civil unions.  As a result, the argument goes, the disparate 
allocation of this value lies outside the state’s control (and therefore 
outside the state’s responsibility).48  As one of the Kerrigan dissenting 
opinions stated, “[m]arriage is more than a relationship sanctioned by our 
laws.”49  “It is,” the opinion continued, “a fundamental and ancient social 
institution that has existed in our state from before its founding and 
throughout the world for millennia.”50 
The following step in the argument turns responsibility for addressing 
the inequity in social value to the discretion of the legislature:  If the 
difference in value between marriage and civil unions is not the state’s 
doing, because marriage predates and outsizes the state, then its undoing, 
rather than being constitutionally mandated, is handled most appropriately 
by the legislature as a political determination.  “In this way,” the Kerrigan 
dissenters argued, “a fundamental social institution . . . is [not] changed by 
the decision of judges,” who are not accountable to social values in the 
same ways as legislators.51  “‘Whether an issue with such far-reaching 
social implications as how to define marriage falls within the judicial or 
democratic realm, to many, is debatable,’”52 Judge Borden wrote in his 
dissenting opinion, expressing a strong preference for any alteration of 
marriage’s scope to occur instead “by a natural process of social change” 
                                                                                                                          
government were to tell them that they no longer were “married” and instead were in a “civil union.”  
The sense of being “married”—what this conveys to a couple and their community, and the security of 
having others clearly understand the fact of their marriage and all it signifies—would be taken from 
them.  These losses are part of what same sex couples are denied when government assigns them a 
“civil union” status.  If the tables were turned, very few heterosexuals would countenance being told 
that they could enter only civil unions and that marriage is reserved for lesbian and gay couples.’” 
(quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. at 5, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 
(No. 17716))). 
48 When invoked by a court, rather than by the state, the history and tradition rationales could also 
be read to mean that the current court feels constrained not to upend previous courts’ and legislatures’ 
embrace of the longstanding rules regarding marriage.  This sense of constraint could, in turn, stem 
from concerns with legitimacy, reliance interests, or a commitment to Burkean-style incrementalism of 
the sort discussed supra note 40 and infra Part IV. 
49 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 503 (Borden, J., dissenting).  The California Court of Appeal made a 
similar point in sustaining the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, stating that “[m]arriage is 
more than a ‘law,’ of course; it is a social institution of profound significance to the citizens of this 
state, many of whom have expressed strong resistance to the idea of changing its historically opposite-
sex nature.”  In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008). 
50 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 503. 
51 Id. at 505 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006)). 
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or with “the general support . . . of the people” through their elected 
representatives.”53 
The State of California made this “not our fault” argument even more 
explicitly than did Connecticut.  In its brief to the state’s highest court, 
California maintained that the state law did all it could or needed to do by 
providing domestic partnership to same-sex couples even while 
maintaining marriage for different-sex couples.  “To the extent that it 
derives from California law,” the state wrote, “there is no right, benefit, 
privilege, or responsibility that can be accomplished by a marriage contract 
that cannot be accomplished by a domestic partnership.”54  Consequently, 
the state argued, same-sex couples suffered no constitutional deprivation as 
a result of the state’s provision of domestic partnership to them and 
marriage to different-sex couples. 
IV. MARRIAGE AS MONOPOLY 
The chief problem with the distinction between state and societal 
responsibility is that it blinks reality.  Although the decision whether to 
marry is left largely to private ordering, marriage itself is not.  A web of 
laws in each state governs who may marry and the conditions under which 
a marriage may be civilly sanctified. 
As a result of these and related rules, only those authorized by the state 
can access “marriage” and, therefore, marriage’s socially valuable 
connotations.  Put another way, the state exercises monopoly authority 
over the entry into, incidents of, and dissolution of civil marriage.  As 
gatekeeper, the state has full control over this value.  This is true regardless 
of whether the value itself is created by the state, by society, or, more 
realistically, by some combination of the two. 
This monopolistic control over the good of marriage means, in turn, 
that the state cannot avoid constitutional liability on the ground that non-
state parties contributed to the good’s value.55  By way of analogy, 
                                                                                                                          
53 Id. at 504–05. 
54 Answer Brief of State of California and the Attorney General to Opening Briefs on the Merits 
at 62, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999); see also id. at 469 (Corrigan, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (declaring that the state can have different designations for same- and 
different-sex couples but “[w]hat they are not entitled to do is treat them differently under the law”); 
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221–22 (“Because this State has no experience with a civil union construct that 
provides equal rights and benefits to same-sex couples, we will not speculate that identical schemes 
called by different names would create a distinction that would offend [the N.J. Constitution].  We will 
not presume that a difference in name alone is of constitutional magnitude.”); Brief of Defendant-
Appellees with Appendix at 14, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. 17716) (“[A] difference in name alone 
between the State’s identical statutory schemes for marriage and civil unions is simply not differing 
treatment of constitutional magnitude.”). 
55 This is different, of course, from a situation in which the state heavily regulates a private 
monopoly, such as a public utility.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).  As the 
Court explained in Jackson, “The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by 
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 350.  
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consider a state’s shoreline or lake front.  The state surely could not justify 
separating access for same-sex and different-sex couples, or drawing other 
similar lines between other social groups, on the ground that it was not 
fully, or even largely, responsible for the shoreline’s or lake front’s value. 
To be clear, the point is not that gay and lesbian couples—or any 
social group, for that matter—have a constitutional right to a particular 
social value, just as neither women nor men have a right to the social 
benefits derived from attending a military training institute56 and neither 
blacks nor whites have a right to the value of a particular law school 
education.57  But when the state wholly controls a status or institution that 
confers these types of benefits, it cannot disclaim responsibility for 
disparate access to the higher-valued good merely because society played a 
role in generating that value. 
While there are many other contexts in which courts are asked to 
determine whether certain acts fall more on the public, and thus 
constitutionally regulable, or private side of the line, two have particular 
resonance here, and both reinforce the point that the state’s monopolistic 
authority renders the “not our fault” defense insufficient to immunize 
government from liability. 
Arguably the closest analogues are cases in which governments have 
been accused of impermissibly fostering private biases.  The marriage 
cases are different, of course, in that those challenging their exclusion from 
marriage seek access to a status that is privately valued58 rather than 
protection from private hostility.  But in both contexts, the fundamental 
question is whether the state can sidestep its equal treatment obligation on 
the ground that the sentiment at issue, whether good or bad, resides in 
private actors, rather than the state.59  
                                                                                                                          
See also id. (stating that “the fact that the regulation is extensive and detailed” does not justify 
subjecting a private monopolist to rules governing state action).  But cf. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. 
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (recognizing state action where a nominally 
private entity has “pervasive entwinement” with the state).  
56 Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (“Women seeking and fit for a [Virginia 
Military Institute]-quality education cannot be offered anything less, under [Virginia’s] obligation to 
afford them genuinely equal protection.”). 
57 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (“[P]etitioner may claim his full constitutional 
right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races.”); see also 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 445 (finding that plaintiffs “persuasively invoke [Sweatt] by analogy”). 
58 The good is characterized as private here only for purposes of developing this argument.  As 
suggested earlier, marriage can be more accurately characterized as having a value created by a mix of 
public and private support. 
59 To be sure, this question is a complicated one, particularly regarding official acts that may have 
negative consequences for a particular social group but are neutral on their face.  Closure of public 
swimming pools, see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971), and a measure making it more 
difficult for the state to build low-income public housing, see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-3 
(1971), for example, were both sustained by the Court against accusations that the government was 
involved in effectuating private racial hostility.  But the crux of the swimming pool case was that the 
government had closed all pools equally and that no evidence showed government involvement when 
the pools reopened with racially segregated access rules.  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 222 (“[T]here is nothing 
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In Shelton v. Tucker, for example, the Court recognized that 
constitutional harm can arise when a state imposes rules that, while neutral 
on their face, expose individuals associated with minority groups or 
positions to privately-generated harms.60  In the course of invalidating an 
Arkansas law requiring teachers to declare their organizational 
memberships, the Court observed “that fear of public disclosure [wa]s 
neither theoretical or groundless” for members of “unpopular or minority 
organizations.”61  The broad disclosure rule infringed associational rights 
precisely because of the “constant and heavy” pressure that teachers would 
face “to avoid any ties” that might run counter to prevailing sentiment.62  
Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the Court considered the relationship 
between privately held sentiments about race and the government’s 
constitutional obligations.  In that case, a white father sought to alter his 
custody agreement with the child’s mother on the grounds that the mother, 
who was white, was romantically involved with an African-American 
man.63  The plaintiff expressed concerns about the prejudice the child 
might face as a result of the mother’s relationship.  The Court, in a holding 
cited widely in marriage cases,64 rejected the father’s claim, holding that 
“the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give” effect to private bias.65 
Although the Court’s observations in these cases focus on private 
prejudice, the crucial point is that a state does not shield itself from 
constitutional accountability on the ground that the regulated individuals 
are exposed to and affected by attitudes or views of private, rather than 
public, actors.  Yet this is precisely the move that the history and tradition 
rationales make; their very purpose is to suggest that marriage’s special 
value lies outside the state’s control and that the state, therefore, in 
exposing couples to this privately-generated differential valuation, is not 
bound by ordinary equal treatment obligations.  Palmore makes clear, 
however, that by controlling a legal status in a way that gives effect to 
private sentiment, the state implicates itself and constitutional restrictions 
                                                                                                                          
here to show the city is directly or indirectly involved in the funding or operation of either pool.”).  And 
the low-income housing referendum’s validity turned on the measure’s race-neutral terms and the 
absence of record evidence showing that the measure was “in fact aimed at a racial minority.”  
Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141.  In both cases, in other words, there was state action but no impermissible 
distinction.  Moreover, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Court cited with approval Justice 
White’s dissenting observation in Palmer that “‘Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may 
not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they 
assume to be both widely and deeply held.’”  Id. at 433 (quoting Palmer, 403 U.S. at 260–61 (1971) 
(White, J., dissenting)). 
60 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
61 Id. at 486–87. 
62 Id. at 486. 
63 Palmore, 466 U.S. 429. 
64 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 479 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
65 Id. at 433. 
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will apply.   
The public-function doctrine similarly helps illuminate the relationship 
between state action and privately created value.  The doctrine provides, 
essentially, that private actors may be subject to constitutional limitations 
when carrying out public functions.  This rule, in turn, requires courts to 
determine the conditions under which private acts should be treated as 
though they were public.66  For purposes here, the doctrine’s critical insight 
is that the private takeover of the government function must be exclusive, 
meaning that individuals must go to the private actor to obtain what they 
ordinarily would seek from government.67 
Governments’ use of the history and tradition rationales to justify the 
marriage/civil union distinction implicates similar concerns, albeit from the 
flipside position.  Rather than casting themselves as private actors, the 
governments invoking these rationales argue that they are distinct from the 
private actors that have added to marriage’s value.  If private actors—
rather than the government—have made it so that marriage has more value 
than civil unions, the argument goes, government should not be limited in 
its legislative authority to draw that distinction. 
But, as the public function doctrine makes clear, when one entity has 
exclusive control over a good that has both public and private dimensions, 
we have more cause to be concerned than when there are multiple access 
points to the good, some public and some private.  In our setting, there is 
no hurdle to proving government action in a conventional sense, of course, 
as is ordinarily at issue in the public function cases.  Instead, the work of 
the tradition and history arguments is to distance the government from the 
arguably private function of according marriage its special value.  Drawing 
from the public function doctrine’s focus on control, however, we can see 
that because the government exercises direct, monopolistic control over 
marriage access, the public/private distinction advanced by the tradition 
and history rationales fall short. 
Some might object that the state’s level of control with regard to the 
value of marriage is overstated here.  After all, plenty of same-sex couples 
call themselves married after entering civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.  And well before civil union and domestic partnership even 
existed as legal frameworks, same-sex couples pronounced themselves 
married, often privately but sometimes socially as well.68 
                                                                                                                          
66 Cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978) (“‘The question is, Under what 
circumstances can private property be treated as though it were public?  The answer . . . is when that 
property has taken on all the attributes of a town.’”) (quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. 
Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
67 See Flagg, 436 U.S. at 158–63.   
68 Couples who call themselves married among friends are often selective about how they 
characterize their relationship to others.  Cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100–01 (11th Cir. 
1997) (en banc) (observing that lesbian plaintiff who was to marry her partner in a religious ceremony 
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Most obviously, though, when same-sex couples hold themselves out 
as married in a state that forbids them from marrying, they do not access 
all of the connotations of marriage afforded to same-sex couples, even if 
they obtain some of them.  To be sure, their friends and family may treat 
them as (and call them) married.  But these couples face an array of 
challenges when they bear the legal label of civil union or domestic 
partnership, regardless of the self-assigned, social label they choose.69  In 
short, however individuals work with (or around) the law that governs their 
lives, the state ultimately controls the formal titling of the relationship, 
which, in turn, shapes many—if not all—of the third-party consequences 
that flow from that naming. 
This brings us to what is perhaps the most fatal of the flaws associated 
with the marriage/civil union distinction, which I address briefly here to 
lay the groundwork for the next Part’s consideration of the incrementalism 
argument.  By declaring that same- and different-sex couples are equal in 
the eyes of the state for purposes of all civil rights and benefits, but 
creating a distinct bureaucracy and status for administering those rights and 
benefits, the state is unavoidably signaling a difference between the two 
types of couples. 
Further, because the status assigned to different-sex couples has high 
social value, as per the history and tradition rationales, and the status 
assigned to same-sex couples has questionable social value precisely 
because of its lack of history and tradition, the difference reflects 
negatively on same-sex couples.  As the Connecticut Supreme Court 
observed, “[a]lthough marriage and civil unions do embody the same legal 
rights under our law, they are by no means ‘equal.’”70  Instead, “the former 
is an institution of transcendent historical, cultural and social significance, 
whereas the latter most surely is not.”71  “Ultimately,” the court added, “the 
message is that what same-sex couples have is not as important or as 
significant as ‘real’ marriage, that such lesser relationships cannot have the 
name of marriage.”72 
                                                                                                                          
indicated her marital status on job application as “engaged” and listed her partner under relatives as her 
“future spouse”). 
69 See, e.g., N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM’N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY 
CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION 6–18 (2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/ 
downloads/1st-InterimReport-CURC.pdf (identifying wide-ranging problems experienced by same-sex 
couples as a result of having a civil union rather than a civil marriage). 
70 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 417 (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 226–27 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring 
and dissenting)); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008) (“While it is true that 
this circumstance may change over time, it is difficult to deny that the unfamiliarity of the term 
‘domestic partnership’ is likely, for a considerable period of time, to pose significant difficulties and 
complications for same-sex couples, and perhaps most poignantly for their children, that would not be 
presented if, like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples were permitted access to the established and 
well-understood family relationship of marriage.”). 
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Taking this difference between the statuses together with the state’s 
claim that it values same- and different-sex couples equally, the only 
plausible explanation for the different marriage rules and their differential 
allocation of status can be hostility, discomfort, or, perhaps, pure 
arbitrariness.  On this point, the law is well settled.  None of these is a 
legitimate basis for government action.73 
And this, in turn, brings us back to the work of the history and tradition 
rationales.  Because the state cannot claim to be acting arbitrarily or with 
hostility toward same-sex couples, history and tradition sound, by contrast, 
like permissible explanations for the line-drawing.  Yet, for the reasons we 
have seen, they cannot legitimately do that work. 
V.  ON THE FLAWS OF INCREMENTALISM  
Finally, the incrementalism rationale, which suggests that states can 
continue to discriminate so long as they are in the process of addressing a 
“social problem,” grows directly out of the history and tradition rationales.  
Not surprisingly, it suffers related flaws.  The rationale, as expressed by 
the lead dissenter in Kerrigan, would allow the marriage/civil union 
distinction because “[i]t is entirely rational for the legislature to address the 
issue of gay marriage step-by-step, rather than all at once.”74 
Incrementalism itself is not an unusual rationale in rational-basis equal 
protection review.  Courts regularly declare that legislatures are “entitled to 
take things one step at a time.”75  As the Kerrigan dissenters put the point, 
“[t]he paradigm of a rational basis upon which challenged legislation may 
                                                                                                                          
73 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional 
amendment which “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; [and thus] 
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests” (emphasis added)); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case 
appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded . . . .”); O’Brien v. Skinner, 
414 U.S. 524, 530–31 (1974) (finding New York statutes prohibiting pretrial detainees and 
misdemeanants from voting “wholly arbitrary,” leaving the court “no choice, therefore, but to hold that, 
as construed, the New York statutes deny appellants the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“For if the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Clough, 242 U.S. 375, 385 
(1917) (noting that when a state court construes and applies a state law based on arbitrary distinctions, 
there is a denial of equal protection.). 
74 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 514 (Borden, J., dissenting); cf. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 471 
(Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Democracy is never more tested than when its citizens 
honestly disagree, based on deeply held beliefs.  In such circumstances, the legislative process should 
be given leeway to work out the differences.”). 
75 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 514; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 
(1955) (“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies. . . . [T]he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”); Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 
608, 610 (1935) (observing that the state need not “strike at all evils at the same time or in the same 
way”). 
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be sustained is that the legislature is not required to solve all aspects of a 
social problem . . . at once.”76  A California dissenter likewise wrote, “[i]n 
a democracy, the people should be given a fair chance to set the pace of 
change without judicial interference.”77 
True enough, but the incrementalism argument is, again, a description 
of, not a justification for, government action.  Here, it describes the state’s 
decision to equalize rights and benefits for different- and same-sex couples 
but not to equalize status.  It does not explain why the state has chosen to 
proceed in this way and to allocate social value to one set of couples but 
not the other.78 
Thus, there must be another explanation suffusing this gap between 
description and explanation if we are to treat incrementalism as a 
meaningful rationale.  The dissent in Kerrigan offered a detailed 
description of the legislature’s step-by-step improvements in treatment of 
same-sex couples, perhaps in an effort to fill out the argument.79  But this 
chronology, while illustrating the legislature’s tilt toward equality, still 
does not explain why the inequalities can continue consistent with the 
equal protection guarantee. 
This is where arguments from history and tradition seep back in by 
implication.  The incrementalist rationale, at least as framed in the 
marriage cases, makes sense only by reference to changes over time.   
Embedded in the argument that the state can move incrementally to redress 
inequality is a claim that because the state has gone some way to rectify 
past inequities, it should be excused, in effect, from having to rectify those 
inequities fully.  The acceptance of incrementalism, as such, suggests as 
well that the state need not even justify its choice of a stopping point in 
remedying past problems other than by citing how far it has moved from 
past practice.   
This, in turn, returns us to the basic constitutional doctrine discussed at 
the outset of this Article.  Since history and tradition cannot justify the 
continuation of past discriminatory practices into the future, it cannot be 
that those same arguments become viable so long as the state has taken a 
partial remedial step.  Indeed, the incrementalist rationale is arguably even 
weaker than the history and tradition rationales discussed above, in that the 
argument itself concedes both the existence of a past problem and the 
                                                                                                                          
76 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 514 (Conn. 2008). 
77 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 471. 
78 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476 n.78 (majority opinion) (“[C]haracterizing the state’s interest in 
terms of changing the law incrementally is simply another way of asserting that the state currently has 
an interest in maintaining the status quo out of respect for tradition.  We therefore see no need to treat 
this proffered reason separately from the state’s asserted interest in tradition.”).  
79 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 493–99 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
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state’s failure to address that problem fully.80 
Although a full consideration of incrementalism as an equal protection 
rationale is beyond this Article’s scope, two arguments in incrementalism’s 
defense warrant brief discussion and rebuttal here.  The first, more 
practical concern is that if incrementalism no longer suffices as a defense 
against equal protection claims, states may be less willing to take even 
partial steps toward equalizing the rights of subordinated groups.  This 
concern may be exacerbated further if the incrementalist rationale is treated 
as not only insufficiently explanatory but also as amounting to a 
concession regarding the impermissibility of existing inequalities, as 
suggested above.  If a state’s “step-by-step” response amounts to a 
concession of constitutional violation, states may become even more risk 
averse than they currently are in redressing entrenched forms of 
discrimination. 
The best, albeit partial, response to this concern is to concede it but 
then argue that the concern, while real, is also overrated.  Although states 
may become more risk averse if the incrementalism rationale is no longer 
available, self-protective inaction will be viable only for as long as society 
is willing to tolerate the inequality at issue in its traditional, historical form.  
Presumably, even under current conditions, most elected officials take 
steps toward reforming past practices only when their political base 
demands change.81  At that point, even if full equalization is fraught with 
political difficulty, the alternative—inaction—may be equally fraught.  The 
reframing accomplished by the removal of the incrementalism defense thus 
arguably, in the course of achieving a more coherent legal principle, also 
makes full equalization more likely.  Put simply, if the only move available 
is toward full equality, pressure may mount to make that move rather than 
do nothing at all. 
The second concern has deep institutional and doctrinal roots, bringing 
                                                                                                                          
80 One might take the contrary position that a state should be considered to have met its 
constitutional obligation once it has done all it can do to approximate equal treatment for all group even 
if it has not provided perfect equality.  But cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 n.3 (2004) 
(characterizing Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as including the 
authority “‘to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)).  Perhaps the strongest argument in this 
regard would be in situations, as in California, where a state’s high court or legislature mandated 
marriage equality but then voters, by initiative, reinstated a measure reserving marriage only for 
different-sex couples.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5  (2008) (reinstating different-sex marriage 
eligibility rule following the California Surpeme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384 (Cal. 2008) rejecting the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage).  Even still, it seems to me 
that while the state’s efforts surely deserve political appreciation, the remaining unequal rules cannot be 
justified, as a constitutional matter, on the basis of the state’s good faith.     
81 Not all elected officials proceed so conservatively, even in this area.  After San Francisco 
mayor Gavin Newsom declared that he would recognize same-sex couples’ marriages, a series of local 
government officials in New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon also stated that they would 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  See Goldberg, Justice for All?, supra note 11, at 38.  Still, 
inertia almost always presents fewer risks for elected officials than diversion from the status quo. 
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with it the spectre of Lochner.82  By telling states that they legislate 
incrementally at their peril, courts arguably exercise undue influence over 
the legislative process and risk undermining valuable separation-of-powers 
principles.  More specifically, disallowing incrementalist lawmaking, 
according to this concern, would run the risk of courts overtaking the 
legislature’s role in determining how best to address social problems and 
engender, in turn, a host of constitutional design and institutional 
competency difficulties. 
Taking this argument further, not only would courts be pressured to 
reach outcomes well ahead of popular sentiment, contrary to apparent 
institutional preferences as reflected in current and historical practice, but 
these rulings might also pose heightened risks to judicial legitimacy, given 
courts’ counter-majoritarian status.83  From this standpoint, the argument 
follows that if the Supreme Court had found itself compelled to order fully 
equal treatment of African Americans and whites, or women and men, at 
the time the earliest challenges to inequalities began to meet with success, 
the resistance those decisions faced would have reached an even more 
pitched scale.84 
These are serious concerns, but I will attempt to meet them here in a 
basic way, leaving further development of these arguments for another 
forum.  First, with respect to separation-of-powers principles, if we take 
seriously constitutional commands that require courts to evaluate 
government classifications to ensure equality, we should have little 
concern, at a theoretical level, that courts are fully enforcing those 
                                                                                                                          
82 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (rejecting the state’s use of its police power 
to restrict bakery employee working hours in the interests of public health).  On the spectre of Lochner 
and related cases, see David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) 
(arguing that the Lochner Court erred in “mak[ing] freedom of contract a preeminent constitutional 
value that repeatedly prevails over legislation that, in the eyes of elected representatives, serves 
important social purposes”).  For a collection of similar “traditional” critiques of Lochner, see David E. 
Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3, 4 n.14 (2003) (cataloguing Lochner-era 
and modern scholarship that argues that “the [Lochner] Court exceeded its legitimate judicial role”).  
For an alternate critique, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) 
(arguing that the primarily problem with Lochner was that the Court treated common law ulres as 
“natural” rather than as a legal construct and then treated government action inconsistent with those 
rules as “unnatural” and illegitimate).   
83 On the ways in which courts restrain their decision-making to preserve their institutional 
legitimacy, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and 
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1960 n.8 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg, Tipping 
Points] (citing sources addressing the ways in which courts “remain roughly within parameters 
acceptable to the surrounding society”).  
Even in state courts where judges are elected, the legitimacy concern could conceivably arise 
because judicial elections typically frame the role of the judge as responsive to, but not fully 
representative of, the views of voters.  Cf. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972) 
(“Manifestly, judges and prosecutors are not representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the 
executive.  Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular 
constituency.” (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964))), aff’d, 409 U.S. 
1095 (1973) (per curiam). 
84 See infra note 95. 
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guarantees.  Indeed, the judiciary’s admission and embrace of partial 
enforcement should give us pause.85 
If this point is correct, then one might argue that the remaining 
concerns associated with rejecting the incrementalist rationale, while 
serious, are consequentialist and that the pragmatic concerns that underlie 
them ultimately should not prevail over our foundational, non-
consequentialist commitment to equality.86  Still, if the judiciary (and 
possibly legislative bodies) lose significant legitimacy in carrying out an 
absolutist commitment to equality, the flame of full equality may not be 
worth the candle of destroying the institutions empowered to secure and 
protect that equality. 
Here, the best response may be to agree that, both in the marriage/civil 
union context and as a general matter, absolutist commitments to principle 
almost inevitably have unintended negative consequences.  In this light, the 
guiding principle I offer here is one that would acknowledge the need for 
courts to make context-sensitive judgments about how best to limit those 
negative consequences but, at the same time, urge courts to remain more 
deliberately committed than they currently are to a non-consequentialist 
analysis of inequalities and a more skeptical view of incrementalist claims.   
Of course, this proposed guiding principle begs a host of questions 
about the factors that should be taken into account in balancing between 
absolute commitments to equality and judicial legitimacy interests.  Any 
move toward context-sensitivity triggers, as well, the challenges associated 
with the choice of standards over more definite rules and grants of 
discretion over detailed restrictions on power.87  Endorsing flexible 
enforcement as a means of accommodating institutional legitimacy 
concerns arguably undermines the force of the non-consequentialist 
                                                                                                                          
85 Courts that have invalidated the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage have made this 
point.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 448 (Cal. 2008) (“[A] court has an obligation to 
enforce the limitations that the California Constitution imposes upon legislative measures, and a court 
would shirk the responsibility it owes to each member of the public were it to consider such statutory 
provisions to be insulated from judicial review.”) (emphasis added); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (“[W]e do not exceed our authority by mandating equal 
treatment for gay persons; in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility.”).  
86 Of course, the question of what the equality commitment actually requires is itself contested, as 
reflected in strong debates regarding the merits of formal and substantive approaches to equality as well 
as the meaning of equality more generally.  See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (discussing 
formal and antisubordination equality theories and their jurisprudential manifestations); Kent 
Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1983) (advocating a 
framework that includes “substantive principles of equality”); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 
17 GA. L. REV. 245, 280–81 (1983) (addressing the substantive effect that equality rhetoric has on legal 
rights and political culture); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 
387, 389 (1985) (“A right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment 
just because another person or class receives it.”); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 537, 596 (1982) (stating that equality “is an empty form having no substantive content”). 
87 For an extended analysis of the consequences of rules and standards formulations, see Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
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argument against incrementalist rationales—that equality guarantees are 
rendered meaningless (or certainly less meaningful) if they are treated as 
contingent and sometimes only partial. 
A second difficulty may be that the proposal ultimately endorses the 
arguably flawed approach courts currently take when they recognize an 
inequality but accept an incrementalist response as sufficient.  Indeed, 
some of the extant marriage/civil union opinions could be described as 
already embodying this context-sensitive position when they find an 
equality violation but leave to the legislature whether to resolve the 
violation via marriage or civil union.88  The New Jersey Supreme Court, 
for example, in deciding that the state could not deny marital rights and 
benefits to same-sex couples but deferring to the legislature on how best to 
remedy that violation, acknowledged the view of some that courts, not 
legislatures, should resolve the remedy question.  “Nevertheless,” the 
majority wrote, “a court must discern not only the limits of its own 
authority, but also when to exercise forbearance, recognizing that the 
legitimacy of its decisions rests on reason, not power.”89 
Still, I would maintain that a paradigm arising from a commitment to 
full equality and an acceptance of incrementalist approaches as exceptional 
rather than as the normal course would be different, and better, than our 
current non-nuanced approach to incrementalist rationales in two important 
ways.  First, states would not be able to prevail with an incrementalist 
rationale as a matter of right, as the Kerrigan dissent seemed to suggest.  
Instead, both states and courts would need to justify the deviation from the 
full equality norm.  This would benefit the analysis by ensuring, at least to 
a greater degree than the current doctrine seems to require, that the 
incrementalist rationale would be recognized for what it is—a partial and 
incomplete move toward equality.  Second, exposing the reasons for 
partial, rather than full, equality would arguably help ensure more reasoned 
deliberation before an incrementalist remedy is accepted. 
As with virtually all efforts to tweak doctrine to force the exposure of 
otherwise undisclosed reasoning, this approach would not necessarily 
change outcomes, particularly among those courts inclined to sidestep the 
remedial question after finding that the absence of marriage rights infringes 
the equality of same-sex couples.  Indeed, in the New Jersey example just 
                                                                                                                          
88 This is also akin to the approach William Eskridge has described as the “jurisprudence of 
tolerance,” by which some forms of inequality are forbidden but “room remains for the state to signal 
the majority’s preference[s].”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: 
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004).  
Eskridge developed this point in connection with Lawrence v. Texas, which he characterized as 
“mean[ing] that traditionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay people or render them 
presumptive criminals, but room remains for the state to signal the majority’s preference for 
heterosexuality, marriage, and traditional family values.”  Id. 
89 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 223 (N.J. 2006). 
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discussed, the court did not find that the absence of marriage per se 
amounted to a violation; it held only that the disparity in marital rights and 
benefits infringed the state constitution.90  Under that framing, which may 
be more typical than the bare incrementalism advanced in the Kerrigan 
dissent, courts do not concede that they have accepted an incremental 
version of equality.  Instead, they characterize the equality violation as 
deriving from the lesser rights accorded to same-sex couples so that 
deference to the legislature to create an equal-rights regime appears to be a 
reasonable resolution rather than an abdication of the court’s responsibility 
as rights-enforcer.   
Moreover, forcing exposure of context-sensitive compromises runs the 
risk, both in these cases and elsewhere, of enshrining as legitimate the 
courts’ taking account of social sentiment in determining the amount of 
equality to which a given group is entitled.  While this filtering of equality 
guarantees through the lens of social norms may be the case regardless of 
whether the doctrinal framework requires exposure or permits elision, 
judicial statements affirming the malleability of constitutional equality 
rights may ultimately do more harm than good to the cause of those who 
seek greater legal protection through equality-based claims.91 
Yet embracing incrementalism as a stand-alone rationale, rather than a 
deviation from the norm that must be explained and justified, runs serious 
risks as well.  States and courts may fail to try hard enough to enforce 
equality guarantees fully (or at least more fully than under current 
conditions).  Further, outright embrace of incrementalism necessarily 
signals, whether intentionally or not, that both the judiciary and 
representative bodies are free to provide constituents with protection short 
of full equality. 
In the end, we are left with something of a difficult choice.  Do we 
insist on a non-instrumental commitment to full equality or accept a 
flexible commitment in exchange for incremental advances and increased 
institutional legitimacy?  Even when we accept flexibility (as I believe we 
have and will continue to do), the difficulties remain, as we must still 
determine how to both administer and express that less-than-unequivocal 
commitment.  As this Article aims to show, there are costs at every turn, 
with no easy answers. 
Brown v. Board of Education,92 popularly known as Brown II, may be 
the paradigmatic illustration of this point.  The Court’s ruling that the 
defendant school districts must desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” 
                                                                                                                          
90 Id. at 220–21. 
91 See generally Goldberg, Tipping Points, supra note 83 (arguing that although courts deciding 
socially contentious cases focus on facts, rather than normative judgments, about social groups, those 
judgments inevitably shape both analyses and outcomes). 
92 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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rather than immediately,93 surely reflects an incrementalist approach.  Its 
consequentialist hedging is particularly striking given the Court’s 
unqualified ruling, just a year earlier, that, “in the field of public 
education[,] the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”94  Yet, as 
some have argued, a more absolutist alternative, insistent on immediate, 
pervasive desegregation, would have spurred great disorder and worse 
harms.95   
As suggested above, my own cost-benefit analysis favors increased 
skepticism toward incrementalist rationales and more exposure of them 
when they are accepted.  At the same time, our history has shown these 
rationales to be among the necessary, if unprincipled, lubricants that enable 
our courts and constitutional system more generally to function amidst the 
complexities of a pluralist world.  Still, I would argue, there is one sharp 
bottom line: However one ultimately comes out on the question of the 
permissibility and desirability of incrementalist rationales, uncritical 
acceptance of incrementalism as a justification for inequality is position 
that cannot be sustained. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In short, the marriage/civil union cases prompt important questions 
about the role of history, tradition, and incrementalism as rationales for 
state-imposed inequality.  These questions, in turn, force a closer look at 
the state’s relationship to private sentiments about who deserves equality 
and how much equality any given group deserves relative to others.  In 
particular, they demand that we consider the advantages and perils of 
allowing states to disclaim responsibility for differentially allocating 
privately-valued goods and, relatedly, allowing states to proceed with 
unequal treatment so long as they are moving toward equality. 
How we respond to these demands depends inevitably on calculations 
about how much we can afford to give up fundamental constitutional 
commitments to equality in exchange for institutional legitimacy and social 
peace.  Acknowledging the contingency of equality in this way surely 
makes many (including me) shudder even as it reflects what has long been 
known about the limited inclinations and abilities of courts, and states 
more generally, to reshape societal norms.96  At the same time, this 
                                                                                                                          
93 Id. at 301.   
94 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).   
95 Yet others have taken the position that the Court’s order, which embraced “practical 
flexibility,” Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300, rather than an unequivocal demand for immediate change, 
undermined the strong commitment to racial equality expressed the previous year in Brown I.  For 
commentary regarding both positions, see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977). 
96 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (discussing limits on judiciary’s power to change social norms and 
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contingency requires us all, whether we shudder or not, to grapple with 
refining the frameworks that influence the meaning of our fluctuating yet 
foundational promise to ensure equal protection of the law. 
 
                                                                                                                          
practices); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 6–7 (1996) (arguing that “the Court's capacity to protect minority rights is more limited than 
most justices or scholars allow” and that “deep-seated political, social, economic, and ideological 
forces . . . have rendered possible the transformation of large areas of constitutional doctrine”). 
